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PROPERTY
David H. Means"
A. Aircraft Noise as Inverse Condemnation?
Two federal district court cases2 involved claims under the
Tucker Act 3 by owners of residences situated near air force bases
for damages to property caused by noise and vibration resulting
from ground tests of jet engines. Recovery was denied on the
ground that since there were no overflights as in United States v.
67ausby4 and Griggs v. Allegheny County,5 there had been no
trespass and therefore no compensable taking of private property
within the fifth amendment. The opinions in both cases rely on
Batten v. United States,0 a decision to the same effect from the
tenth circuit court of appeals, in which Chief Judge Murrah dis-
sented. Although at least two state courts7 have allowed compen-
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. Inverse condemnation has been defined as the popular description of a
cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant,
even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency.
City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1964).
2. Bellamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Leavell v.
United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a) (2) (1952) gives district courts original jurisdiction,
concurrent with the Court of Claims, over a claim against the United States
not exceeding 10,000 dollars in amount, "founded ... upon the Constitution...
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States." The last
clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution reads: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.'
4. 328 U.S. 256 (1946),
5. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
6. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). Indicat-
ing that under some circumstances there might be a recovery without overflight,
the court said:
In discussing the meaning of the word 'taken', the court said in United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 ... that governmental
action short of occupancy was a taking 'if its effects are so complete as
to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter.
In the instant case there is no total destruction and no deprivation of
'all or most' of the plaintiffs' interests. The plaintiffs do not suggest
that any home has been made uninhabitable or that any plaintiff has moved
because of the activities at the Base. The record shows nothing more than
an interference with use and enjoyment.
306 F.2d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1962). The opinions in both Leavell and Bellamy
note that while the plaintiffs sustained substantial damage, there was no taking
within the stated test.
7. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 232 Ore. 482, 376 P.2d 100 (1962);
Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964). In Batten,
after noting the distinction between a taking and consequential damages, the
court stated:
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sation where overflight was lacking, Batten, represents the pre-
vailing rule of the federal courts.
In Leavell v. United States8 a further count was brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act9 for personal injuries. Recovery
was denied on the ground that "the plaintiffs herein have failed
to prove that the government employees . . . were guilty of any
negligent or wrongful act or omission in connection with the
program for testing jet engines on the air force installation.110
The court found that "the decision as to where to locate the 'jet
engine trim pad' was a discretionary function which falls within
the exception to the Tort Claims Act and cannot be the basis of
a tort claim against the United States."'"
B. Boundary Dispute
Douglas V. Pery,'2 a disputed boundary case, reaffirms the
well settled principle that in an action of trespass to try title, the
plaintiff "must recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title;
Because of this rule which denies the recovery of consequential dam-
ages in the absence of any taking, many state constitutions provide in
substance that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without compensation. However, the federal obligation has not been
so enlarged either by statute or by constitutional amendment.
306 F2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962). In Thornburg recovery was allowed in the
absence of overflight despite the fact that the Oregon Constitution, art. I, § 18,
does not permit the recovery of compensation for property "damaged" for a
public purpose. The court said:
If we accept, as we must upon established principles of the law of servi-
tudes, the validity of the propositions that a noise can be a nuisance; that
a nuisance can give rise to an easement; and that a noise coming straight
down from above one's land can ripen into a taking if it is persistent
enough and aggravated enough, then logically the same kind and degree
of interference with the use and enjoyment of one's land can also be a
taking even though the noise vector may come from some direction other
than the perpendicular.
376 P.2d 100, 106 (1962). While Washington Constitution, art. I, § 16
does provide compensation for a "damaging" of property, in Martin the Wash-
ington court indicated recovery would be allowed without overflight on the
theory of a "taking":
We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for interference with
the use of land should depend upon anything as irrelevant as whether the
wing tip of the aircraft passes through some fraction of an inch of the
airspace directly above the plaintiff's land. The plaintiffs are not seeking
recovery for a technical trespass, but for a combination of circumsatnces
engendered by the nearby flights which interfere with the use and en-
joyment of their land.
64 Wash. 2d 309, 312, 391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964).
8. Leavell v. United States, sumra note 2.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1962).
10. 234 F. Supp. 734, 742 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
11. Id. at 741.
12. 245 S.C. 486, 141 S.E.2d 348 (1965).
1966]
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and the burden [is] upon him to prove paramount title to the
land."' 8 The circuit judge held not only that the plaintiff had
failed to establish paper title, but also that defendant had title
by adverse possession. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed.
0. Dedication-Permissible Use of Dedicated Land
In Knoerr v. Orews14 the question was whether the city of Sen-
eca might construct parking facilities on land which by deed in
1873 had been dedicated for "open squares for the convenience
of the public and the said Railway Company .... ."15 The deed
was one conveying a railway right of way and the dedication was
of lands retained by the grantor. A portion of the dedicated land
had long been used as a parking area while the remainder, now
sought to be so used, had been used as a park maintained by the
city and planted by private citizens and garden club groups.
In holding that the city might construct parking facilities,
the court thus stated the rule:
Generally when property is dedicated to the public, the
intent of the dedicator as to the use to which it may be put
controls. Where such intent is clearly expressed and is spe-
cific and restricted, no deviation from such use may be per-
mitted no matter how advantageous the changed use may be
to the public .. .; however, where the intention of the dedi-
cator is uncertain or the dedication is in general, unrestric-
tive terms, the property can be used for any public purpose
as determined by the proper legal authority, and the fact
that the property has been devoted to one use does not de-
prive its devotion to other more comprehensive uses.10
Applying the stated rule, the court found that "use of the
property for public parking is consistent with the object to which
the property was dedicated and the fact that a portion .. .has
been used for park purposes over a long period of time does not
impair the right of the city to use the land for other public pur-
poses consistent with the dedication."17
13. Id. at 488, 141 S.E.2d at 349. The quoted statement of course, presupposes
that the plaintiff or his predecessor was not wrongfully deprived of possession
by the defendant. See e.g., Nicholson v. Villepegue, 91 S.C. 231, 74 S.E. 506
(1912).
14. 246 S.C. 174, 143 S.E.2d 120 (1965).
15. Id. at 176, 143 S.E.2d at 120.
16. Id. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 120.
17. Id. at 177, 143 S.E.2d at 121.
[Vol. 18
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D. Eminent Domain-Damage to Owner's Retained Land
In South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Westboro Weaving
Co.,1s the department condemned for highway purposes land
which defendant textile plant had acquired in 1939 as a proposed
site for pretreating its waste products should such become neces-
sary. The regulations of the sewer district require pretreatment
of plant waste- before discharge into the sewers if, in the opinion
of the district, such pretreatment becomes necessary. About ten
years prior to trial, the district communicated with the defendant
relative to pretreatment of defendant's waste but such was never
required and the defendant "has no plans to construct in the
immediate future, within a reasonable time, or possibly ever, such
plant."1 9
The land condemned lies below the level of the plant and
could be used as a pretreatment area without the necessity of
pumping the wastes thereto whereas other available sites would
necessitate the employment of pumps. The agreed value of the
land condemned was 1,176 dollars, and the sole issue was whether
expert testimony regarding damage to defendant's retained
land2 9 was too remote and speculative. This testimony was to
the effect that the availability of a waste disposal site was a
factor affecting present market value of the plant and that the
lack of such a site would reduce the plant's value by 15,000 dol-
lars. By a three-to-two decision, the lower court's exclusion of
the proffered testimony was affirmed. The majority concluded
that "the site had been acquired as insurance against the day, if
ever, when it would be required to pretreat its waste, which is
too remote and speculative." 21 The dissenting justices reasoned:
[T]he testimony dealt with the impact which the loss of
the site had on the present market value of the remaining
property. Since the . . . sewer district has the right to re-
quire pretreatment whenever in its judgment such should
become necessary, . . . a prospective purchaser would be
vitally interested in the means at hand to meet such need if
it should be made .... Perhaps the demand will never be
made, but the contingency and the impairment of the means
18. 244 S.C. 516, 137 S.E2d 776 (1964).
19. Id. at 518, 137 S.E.2d at 778.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 135 (1962) provides: "In assessing compensation and
damages for rights of way, only the actual value of the land to be taken there-
for and any special damages resulting therefrom shall be considered."
21. Supra, note 18 at 522, 137 S.E.2d at 779.
1966]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 17
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss1/17
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
at hand to meet it result, logically and according to the
expert testimony, in depreciation in market value. This is
present, instead of remote, and no more speculative than any
opinion testimony as to the depreciation in the market value
of real estate.
22
Ef. Estate in Fee Simple Conditional
Soarborough v. Scarborough2 3 concerned certain aspects of the
fee simple conditional 24 estate as it exists in South Carolina. In
a suit for partition of land, the disputed item of the will con-
tained three sentences which for convenient discussion have been
numbered:
[1] I . . . devise . . . all of my Real property . . . in
equal shares to my wife [L] and my daughter [J]. [2] My
wife . . . shall take the real estate so devised to her . . .
during her natural life and at her death to my daughter [J] ;
and if my said daughter . . . should die leaving no heirs of
the body, then the same shall revert back to the heirs of the
Testator. [3] My daughter . . . shall take the real estate
so devised to her . . . and at her death to the Heirs of her
body, and if my said daughter . . . die leaving no Heirs of
the body, then and in that event, the real property so devised
to her . . . shall revert back to the Heirs of the Testator.
2 5
The lower court held that subject to the wife's life estate in
one half the land, the daughter took a fee simple conditional
estate in both moieties. This was on the theory that the third
sentence 20 of the quoted item applied not only to the equal share
given the daughter in the first sentence, but also to the daughter's
remainder interest in the equal share given the mother for life
22. Supra, note 18 at 523, 137 S.E.2d at 780.
23. 246 S.C. 51, 142 S.E.2d 706 (1965).
24. In Scarborough, as in most of the South Carolina cases, the estate is
designated fee conditional. The preferred designation, it would seem, is fee
simple conditional. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY Ch. 5, Introductory Note (1940) ;
CASNER & LEACH, CASES & TEXT ON PROPERTY 276 (1st student ed. 1959). The
latter designation is employed in Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d
913 (1959).
25. Scarborough v. Scarborough, supra note 23, at 53, 142 S.E2d at 707.
26. S.C. CODE ANm. § 57-2 (1962), wvhich abolishes the Rule in Shelley's
Case, is inapplicable to instruments executed prior to October 1, 1924. Since
the will was executed in 1909, the rule applied to sentence three of the item,
thus giving the daughter an estate in fee simple conditional rather than a life
estate. Strother v. Folk, 123 S.C. 127, 115 S.E. 605 (1922). The operation
of the rule is discussed in the circuit decree (Record, p. 25) but not in the
opinion of the supreme court.
[Vol. 18
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in the second sentence. However, the supreme court found that
the third sentence was not intended to modify the specific estate
devised the daughter by the second sentence. Therefore, the
daughter held the remainder following the wife's life estate in fee
simple, subject to an executory devise27 to the heirs of the testator
should the daughter die leaving no heirs of the body. Since the
daughter died survived by children her interest passed under
her will as a fee simple absolute.
Both the circuit judge and the South Carolina Supreme Court
agreed that sentence three28 of the item gave the daughter an
estate in fee simple conditional which the court said she could
alienate during her life, but could not dispose of by will. The
daughter did not alienate during her lifetime and her will was
ineffective to pass the fee conditional estate. The same passed
in accordance with the form of the gift, continuing fee condi-
tional in her children .... 129
While the quoted statement accords with earlier South Caro-
lina decisions,30 a later case, Blume 'v. Pearcy31 had engendered
confusion as to whether the estate continues in the heirs of the
body as a fee simple conditional or descends to them in fee simple
absolute. Scarborough holds that the land descends in fee simple
conditional: "[W]e do not think the court [in Blume] intended
to change or modify the rules adhered to in the foregoing de-
cisions.1 3
2
One question which it was unnecessary to reach in Scarborough
remains for later decision. Even though the estate continues as
a fee simple conditional in the issue of the tenant granted such
an estate, may the issue convey in fee simple absolute before they
themselves have been the parents of children? Although the
27. Executory devise rather than possibility of reverter (the court's desig-
nation) would seem a more accurate description of the qualifying language
following the devise of the fee in sentence two. See e.g., Drummond v. Drum-
mond, 146 S.C. 194, 143 S.E. 818 (1928).
28. Since the daughter was survived by children, the executory devise should
she die leaving no heirs of the body was inoperative. Such executory devise
following an estate in fee simple conditional is valid since enactment of the
definite failure of issue statute of 1853. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-3 (1962). Cannon
v. Ballenger, 222 S.C. 39, 71 S.E2d 513 (1952); Dukes v. Shuler, 185 S.C.
303, 194 S.E. 817 (1938) ; Selman v. Robertson, 46 S.C. 262, 24 S.E. 187 (1896)
Note 5 S.C.L.Q. 69, 71 (1952).
29. Supra note 23, at 57, 142 S.E.2d at 709.
30. Warnock v. Wightman, 1 Brevard 331 (S.C. 1804); Withers v. Jenkins,
14 S.C. 597 (1880).
31. 204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E2d 673 (1944). For a collection of citations bearing
on the question see Note 5 S.C.L.Q. 313, 353, n.146 (1), (2) (1953).
32. Supra note 23, at 58, 142 S.E.2d at 710.
1966]
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South Carolina cases appear not to have considered the ques-
tion,33 there is authority that issue of the tenant in fee simple
conditional have power by deed (but not by devise) to convey
in fee simple absolute before they themselves have had issue,
although if no such conveyance is made the estate continues as
a fee simple conditional. 4 It is to be hoped that the South Caro-
lina court will so hold in a proper case. Certainly there is no
modern justification for the continued existence of the estate in
fee simple conditional. Therefore, a rule which facilitates the
conversion of such an estate into a fee simple absolute is indeed
worthy of adoption when such may be done consistent with
precedent.
F. Lease Cancellation
In Stalvey v. Pure Oil Co. 5 the lessee of a petroleum service
station had been licensed to use as a customer parking area, and
to install petroleum pumps on, a municipally-owned strip of
land lying between the highway and the leased premises. Upon
the widening of the highway, the license was terminated and as
a result lessee's use of the leased premises as a service station for
motor trucks was no longer profitable.
A clause in the lease provided in part:
If, at any time during the term of this lease or any exten-
sion hereof, the use of the leased premises as a service station
for the sale of petroleum products, automobile accessories
and service, shall be prevented, suspended or limited by any
zoning statute or ordinance, or any other Municipal or Gov-
ernmental action, law or regulation; or if the use of said
premises for such purposes be affected or impaired by the
widening, altering, or improving of any streets fronting or
adjoining said premises; then in any of such events Lessee
may cancel this lease by giving thirty days written notice
thereof to Lessor.3 6
The Lessee contended that the clause authorized its cancellation
of the lease; the lessor that cancellation was not permitted since
33. However, see the court's statement of argument of counsel in Adams v.
Chaplin, 1 Hill's Eq. 265, 267 (S.C. 1833).
34. CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY 266 (Sweet's ed.); 1 Cruise, Digest 28, tit. 2
c. 1, § 7 (ist Am. ed. 1808) ; Co. Litt. 19a; 2 Blackstone 100 semble (10th ed.
1787). See Nevil's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 33a, 77 Eng. Rep. 460, 464 (1604).
35. 234 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.S.C. 1964), aff'd., 346 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1965).
36. 346 F.2d 1009, 1010 (4th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 18
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no part of the premises described in the lease had been taken.
In the lessor's suit for rent, which was removed to the federal
district court, Judge Hemphill held that the lessee was entitled
to cancel despite the fact that the changes took place outside
the described lot of premises, since the lease agreement clearly
indicated that the acts or actions or changes affecting the use of
the premises need not be confined to the described lot, or directly
operate on it.
G. Mortgagee's Assertion Against Mortgagor of Title to
Mortgaged Land
In May v. Jeter 7 the circuit judge concluded that a mortgagee
who purchased at a tax sale and thereafter occupied the mort-
gaged premises until his death some twenty-six years later had
not acquired title by adverse possession against the mortgagor,
sister of the mortgagee's wife. This was on the theory that no
evidence established that the adverse holding had been brought
home to the mortgagee beyond the period of the statute of limi-
tations. Nevertheless, the mortgagor's interest was held to be
barred by laches because of the long delay in asserting her claim.
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, find-
ing that the doctrine of laches had been correctly applied. The
court stated the rule as to adverse possession:
[It] is well established, at least in this jurisdiction that
where a mortgagee enters with the permission, either express
or implied, of the mortgagor, he occupies the premises in the
quasi character of trustee for the mortgagor and cannot hold
adversely to the rights of the mortgagor until he distinctly
disavows and repudiates his mortgagee relationship and
notice thereof is brought home to the mortgagor. While such
trustee relationship continues, the mortgagee cannot acquire
title to the property by virtue of a tax deed alone. 8
The court further noted that the result of the circuit decree
was sustainable on the additional ground that mortgagee's ex-
clusive occupancy for more than twenty years presumed an ouster
which, unrebutted by the record, would confer title by presump-
tion of a grant upon the mortgagee.
Still another problem was whether an instrument in the form
of a deed executed and given by mortgagee to his niece was
37. 245 S.C. 529, 141 S.E.2d 655 (1965).
38. Id. at 536, 141 S.E2d at 658.
1966]
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intended to operate as a deed of conveyance. The court found
that it was not so intended:
[W]e think it clear that the terms of the instrument itself
reserved to [mortgagee] not just a life estate, as argued by
[the niece] but the right to sell and dispose of various por-
tions, if not all, of the property during his lifetime. In brief,
neither the instrument itself, nor the circumstances surround-
ing its execution show an intent .. . to immediately pass
...any estate or interest in the land.39
H. Rent-Recovery of Mistaken Overpayments
McDonald's Corp. v. Moore40 was a diversity action in the fed-
eral district court by a tenant against his landlord for the recov-
ery of rental overpayments. Upon discovery of the mistake, the
defendant refused to return the overpayments and credited them
to the final months of the term which would end in 1991. District
Judge Wyche found the testimony to establish that the overpay-
ments "were made under an honest mistake of a material fact
and were not voluntary payments but were mistakenly made as
the result of forgetfulness, inadvertence, oversight and a clerical
error .... ,,41 Since there had been no change of position on
the defendant's part, it was held that the plaintiff might recover
the overpayments together with interest from the time of demand
for return.
I. Residential Restritive Covenants-Beauty Parlor As Breach
In Cothran v. Stroman2 restrictive covenants in a deed, among
other things, provided:
1. No lot shall be used except for residential purposes ...
7. No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon
any lot, nor shall anything be done thereon which may be
or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighbor-
hood, or that may affect the value of the property.43
The court held that operation of a one-operator beauty parlor
on the premises, even though it did not constitute a noxious or
39. Id. at 541, 141 S.E.2d at 661.
40. 237 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
41. Id. at 877.
42. 246 S.C. 42, 142 S.E2d 368 (1965).
43. Id. at 44, 142 S.E.2d at 368.
[Vol. 18
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offensive activity, was a commercial activity which violated the
covenant restricting the premises to use for residential purposes,
and enjoined the defendants from conducting such enterprise in
their home.
J. Surface Water Damage Caused by Highway Improvements
In Lail v. South Carolina Btate Highway Dept.44 the court
held as a matter of law that the plaintiff had failed to establish
that surface water damage to her land was caused by the defend-
ant's construction of highway improvements. "[T]he proper test
to be . . . applied as to causal connection is whether or not the
damages sustained by the plaintiff would have been sustained
had it not been for the construction work done by the defend-
ant."46 After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that
the circuit judge erred in not directing a verdict for defendant.
H. Legislation
Act No. 38346 is legislation designed to control pollution of the
air of South Carolina. Administration of the provisions of the
act is delegated to the authority formerly known as the Water
Pollution Control Authority of South Carolina, the designation
of which is changed to the Pollution Control Authority of South
Carolina.
44. 244 S.C. 237, 136 S.E2d 306 (1964).
45. Id. at 247, 136 S.E.2d at 312.
46. S.C. Acrs & J. Rss. 1965, p. 687, amending S.C. CoDE ANN. § 70 (1962).
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